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GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (APRIL 2002).

I. INTRODUCTION

Opponents of the death penalty have a lot of ammunition in their
arsenals. This country's history of the administration of the death penalty is
fraught with evidence of racism. Only in rare instances has anyone other
than a poor person been executed. There is no evidence that the death
penalty deters crime. The United States is the only western country that
continues to execute. The United States is one of the only countries in the
world that still executes juveniles, only recently having been prevented
from executing the mentally ill. The Supreme Court and Congress have
placed obstacles in the way of fair adjudication of capital cases that elevate
' Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Clinical Education, Director, Bluhm Legal
Clinic, Northwestern University School of Law.
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procedure over substance to the extent it is not clear that our court of last
resort would step in to save the life of a defendant whose innocence is
substantially established. All of this despite the fact that.we have come
precariously close to executing innocent defendants. All of this despite the
fact that other countries with well-established respect for human rights have
either eliminated the death penalty or carry it out as punishment for only the
most egregious of crimes.
The three books reviewed in this essay take different, and equally
effective, approaches to describing these contradictions and to suggesting
strategies to abolish the death penalty in the United States. Franklin
Zimring, in The Contradictionsof American CapitalPunishment, examines
the American death penalty in the context of international and national
politics and public policy.' He asks why the death penalty persists in the
United States in light of the international consensus against it and the many
rational and compelling reasons for its abolition in the United States. He
argues that an intelligent campaign for abolition can only be charted if the
challenges mounted by the opposition are fully understood. The collected
essays in Beyond Repair? America's Death Penalty,2 address in detail
specific issues relevant to the death penalty, ranging from the influence of
public opinion to the difficulties involved in ensuring that capital juries are
capable of understanding and following the jury instructions that should,
but in fact may not, control their life and death decisions. Finally, Professor
Joan Jacobs Brumberg's Kansas Charley: The Story of a 19th Century Boy
Murderer,3 is a detailed examination of one nineteenth century case
involving the execution of a juvenile. Professor Brumberg's book brings
home the importance of the examination of individual cases as a means of
understanding the phenomenon of American capital punishment. Her book
confirms what many who represent defendants in capital cases know: the
more familiar we become with a client, the more we understand the forces
and influences which led both to the crime and to the prosecution, the more
compelling the case for abolition.
Having attempted to make the point that these three books taken
individually and especially together make an unassailable case for abolition,
I recognize that I must be wrong about this assertion. The arguments,
explicit and implicit, made in these books have been made before. Yet the
public is not rising up against the death penalty. Quite to the contrary,

FRANKLIN

E.

ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

(2003).
2 BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY

(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).

3 JOAN JACOBS BRUMBERG, KANSAS CHARLEY: THE STORY OF A 19TH CENTURY BOY
MURDERER (2003).

2003] UNDERSTANDING AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM

211

support for the death penalty in the United States seems strong and in little
immediate danger of waning in the near future. Perhaps the best proof of
the strength of support for the death penalty is the fact that no candidate for
state-wide or national office could win an election after announcing
opposition to the death penalty. Even the most "progressive" politicians I
know or read about regard opposition to the death penalty as a veritable kiss
of political death.
There is a vast political and emotional disconnect between death
penalty opponents and those who embrace the death penalty. This is not a
unique observation. But it is reinforced by personal experiences--one
ordinary, one unusual. The first experience, that is shared by every lawyer
who represents clients in death penalty cases, is facing the equally
committed and aggressive positions and actions taken by prosecutors who
favor the death penalty. Prosecutors who favor the death penalty do so for
as many reasons as those who oppose the death penalty. Just deserts, the
political advantage of being perceived tough on crime, and retribution are
all part of the mix.
The "unusual experience" was that of representing four defendants in
the Illinois clemency hearings held in the Fall of 2002. These hearings
preceded Governor Ryan's pardons of four death row inmates and
commutation of all then existing death sentences in Illinois to natural life
without parole. Prosecutors brought the families of victims to those
hearings. Although many of the presentations made by defense lawyers on
behalf of their clients were powerful in addressing systemic and casespecific shortcomings of our death penalty system, no objective observer
could contend that our (the defense lawyers') presentations were anywhere
near as powerful as the pleas of victims' family members. The pain
expressed by family members of victims brought tears to the eyes of even
the most cynical defense lawyer and further outrage to the hearts of death
penalty proponents. Despite the sound logical arguments that can be made
against resting life and death decisions on such understandably emotional
appeals to passion, it is not possible to ignore their power.
What can be done to create a meaningful dialogue between the
emotional/political power of pro-death penalty advocates and the rational
arguments made by abolitionists, which point to irrefutable flaws in a
system that condemns the innocent, that fails to provide adequate
representation to defendants, and that has restricted meaningful appellate
and collateral review? As it stands now, the two communities of interest
are talking past each other. There is little reason to believe that this will
change. Perhaps that is why leading thinkers on the subject, such as Frank
Zimring, believe that appealing to the lawyers, judges, and legislators who
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control the death penalty system is of secondary importance. They believe

that the primary focus should be on mounting an effective public campaign
against the death penalty which focuses on an emerging human rights

consensus and on the system's propensity to commit error without a
corresponding willingness to correct those errors.
This conclusion, while realistic, is distressing to lawyers like me who
would like to see changes made before the end of our careers. It means

business as usual, at least in the courtroom, for the foreseeable future. I
suggest that there is another alternative, at least for lawyers. Take the
information, analyses, and stories presented by the books reviewed in this
essay and use them to fashion a more concerted effort to bring to more
states what has been accomplished in Illinois-a moratorium followed by a
thorough examination of the death penalty process, followed by legislation
designed to address systemic defects. This approach is best illustrated by
the Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment4
(hereinafter referred to as "Ryan Commission's Report"). In states where
suspension of the imposition of the death penalty is not a political
possibility, examination of the process could be undertaken and legislative
proposals made. State commissions examining capital punishment systems

should be drawn from all communities and should include those in favor of
and those opposed to the death penalty. Exposing defects and proposing
improvements may substantially reduce the number of death penalty
prosecutions while ensuring a fairer process for those defendants the state
seeks to execute.5 The books reviewed in this essay and the Ryan
4 See ILL. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (April 2002) [hereinafter RYAN COMMISSION's
REPORT].
5 For example, after the Ryan Commission's Report was issued, a bill was presented to

the Illinois Legislature that would require confessions in homicide cases to be videotaped.
S.B. 15, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Il1. 2003). This bill has been signed into law. See
2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-517 (West). In addition, legislation has passed the Illinois
General Assembly, S.B. 472, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (II. 2003), codifying many of the
recommendations of the Ryan Commission, including broader discovery provisions,
disclosure requirements specific to the testimony of informants, and lineup procedures
designed to reduce suggestiveness. See John Chase & Ray Long, Death Penalty Reform
Passes; Deal is Reached on Police Perjury, CI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 2003. Previously, in
response to the crisis in Illinois prompted by the identification of thirteen wrongfully
convicted death row inmates, the Illinois Supreme Court enacted rules governing discovery
in capital cases, see ILL. COMP. STAT. S. CT. RULE 416 (2003), as well as certification
requirements for counsel who try capital cases. ILL. COMP. STAT. S. CT. RULE 714 (2003)

(creating a "Capital Litigation Trial Bar" and imposing training requirements for admission).
After those rules were passed, the Supreme Court of Illinois required all circuit court judges

eligible to hear capital cases to attend training sessions covering the law and management of
capital cases. ILL. COMP. STAT. S. CT. RULE 43 (2003) (requiring judges who may hear death
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Commission's Report suggest the need for such an approach while we wait
for further developments, based upon perhaps now unforeseen
developments, in the court of public opinion. The Ryan Commission's
Report sets the bar high for continuing use of the death penalty, a bar that
our justice system may not be able to meet. Moreover, the setting of such
standards, even by a non-legislative body, are bound to become a
meaningful, although not a controlling, component of the common law of
Illinois' capital punishment system. Just as international norms regarding
capital punishment are seen as potentially powerful influences in the
American debate over the death penalty, norms established by such bodies
as the Ryan Commission may be seen as increasingly influential.
The books and report reviewed in this essay, through their
examinations of the phenomenon of American capital punishment, expose
flaws in our criminal justice system, not specific to death penalty cases.
These flaws suggest that our system of justice may not be the best in the
world as is widely proclaimed. The phenomenon of capital punishment,
with all of its flaws, gives our justice system a bad name, especially in the
international community. Wrongful convictions in death penalty cases
occur with unsettling frequency. Is there any reason to believe that the
systemic defects (under-funded and poor lawyering, especially in
investigation and trial preparation, over-reliance upon confessions in police
investigations, reliance upon informants and "jail house snitches,"
investigative "tunnel vision," and reliance on poor science) identified by
the
6
Ryan Commission do not infect the rest of the criminal justice process?
II.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

An underlying thesis of Franklin Zimring's important and provocative
new book, The Contradictionsof American CapitalPunishment, is that in
order to identify effective strategies for achieving the abolition of the death
penalty in the United States, one must understand the forces that have
established and continue to make the death penalty an accepted part of the
American mainstream. To help us understand the seemingly unyielding
political and philosophical strata upon which the death penalty rests,
Professor Zimring contrasts the experience of Western European

penalty cases to attend Capital Litigation Seminars). Perhaps most significantly, the Illinois
Supreme Court amended Rule 3.8 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct with a new
paragraph (a): "The duty of a public prosecutor or other government lawyers is to seek
justice, not merely to convict." ILL. COMP. STAT. S. CT. RPC 3.8(a) (2003).
6 See RYAN COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 4 (identifying flaws in the Illinois
criminal justice system which produced wrongful convictions in thirteen Illinois death
penalty cases). This Report is discussed in more detail infra Part V.
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governments, which quietly abolished the death penalty even when there
was much popular support for it, to the experience of the U.S., where calls
for abolition provoke such strident responses from politicians and the public
that there is no way of avoiding an intense, and, perhaps, ultimately futile,
public debate. Why did European governments have such an easy time of it
when they decided to abolish the death penalty? Why is the opposite true in
the United States?
To answer this question, Zimring looks to the phenomena of
vigilantism and lynching that occurred mostly in southern states where
eighty-nine percent of executions have been carried out since the death
penalty was reinstated.'
This tradition, Zimring argues, explains why,
contrary to what we might expect, citizens in states with a long tradition of
suspicion of centralized power in government approve of their states'
imposition of the ultimate penalty.8 Zimring later characterizes this "theory
of American difference" 9 as a "plausible theory" to explain how vigilante
traditions might influence contemporary attitudes, to survey available
evidence on the theory presented, and to suggest the further tests that can
draw us closer to understanding the link between one of the most troubling
chapters of the American past and the controversial and distinctive
circumstances of execution in the American present.' 0
Efforts to resolve the conflict between those who favor and those who
oppose the death penalty will have to focus on resolving the conflict
between those who hold to the notion that government is too weak to
protect the individual (descendants of the vigilante tradition) and those who
worry that government is too powerful (adherents of the "due process

7 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that punishment of death did not,

under all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). The death penalty
was invalidated by the Supreme Court as it existed in 1972. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
8 ZIMRING,

supra note 1, at 89.

Those parts of the United States where mob killings were repeatedly inflicted as crime control
without government sanction are more likely now to view official executions as expressions of
the will of the community rather than the power of a distant and alien government. For this
reason, modem executions are concentrated in those sections of the United States where the
hangman used to administer popular justice without legal sanction. Of equal noteworthiness,
those areas of the United States where lynchings were rare a century ago are much less likely
now to have a death penalty or to execute. In this important respect, the propensity to execute in
the twenty-first century is a direct legacy of a history of lynching and of the vigilante tradition if
it is still a part of regional culture.

Id.
Id. at 118.
t0 Id.
9
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mindset")." The debate on the future of the death penalty in the United
States, Zimring argues, must focus on converting one mind-set to the
other 2 when the debate is relatively "low stakes" to most of the citizenry. 13
Despite the fact that both the ingrained nature of the death penalty in
American society and the "low stakes" relevance of the debate to the
ordinary citizen, Zimring argues that, "the end game for American capital
punishment has already begun but ... the struggle will be intense. ' 4
In order to help understand the direction in which the struggle for
abolition might take us, we need to understand where the struggle has been.
During the 1990's, the number of executions increased almost fivefold15
and conflict over the death penalty intensified. Despite the increase in
executions, those in favor of the death penalty chaffed at the procedural
hurdles that were placed in the .way of carrying out the death penalty and
turned to Congress to obtain legislation that would speed up the process.
Those opposed to the death penalty argued that speeding up the process
would inevitably limit our justice system's ability to adequately review the
propriety of convictions and sentences. The proponents of the death
penalty won this battle. Rules were enacted that were designed to prevent
1 6
prolonged litigation over the justness of convictions and death sentences.
The ultimate test of the justness of such rules played out in cases in which
last minute (and procedurally defaulted) claims of innocence were
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States. 7 After Herrera, the

" Id. at 122.
The vigilante mindset assumes that the offender can be identified without legal procedures, while
the due process mindset assumes there is substantial difficulty in sorting out the guilty from the
innocent. Behind that contrast lies another: The criminal offender is an outsider in the vigilante
imagination, not a genuine member of the community. No wonder he is so easy to identify.

Id.
12

Id. at 130 ("No stable and long-term solution to the death penalty conflict seems likely

without reducing the power of one of the two traditions that stand behind the dispute.").
13 Id. at 133-34.
The dispute over the death penalty is a low-stakes matter when compared with the epic struggle
between nondiscrimination and race segregation ....
[Nlobody's definition of self, no person's
livelihood or basic citizenship is at stake when executions are present or absent in state
government, except, of course, the condemned. Capital punishment in the United States is not a
way of life.

Id.
14

Id.at 141.

"5 Id. at 144.

16 Id. at 148 ("The strategy [of death penalty proponents] was to restrict the types of
objections that condemned prisoners could raise on appeal and to provide ironclad legal
reasons for rejecting any last-minute appeals as the time for execution draws near.").
17 See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Justice Rehnquist wrote:
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question is whether, as we look to the future, the Supreme Court will decide
that execution of an innocent defendant is inconsistent with the
Constitution. 8 Justice Rehnquist noted that even if such an "assumed
right" exists, the "showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be
extraordinarily high."'19 Zimring identifies the moral dissonance of the
Supreme Court's reluctance to state unequivocally that our Constitution
protects against the execution of the innocent as a potential fault line in
death penalty proponents' efforts to limit access to the courts. Thus, the
strategy of attacking the death penalty based on the possibility that the
innocents will be executed effectively raises the conflict between speeding
up the process and reducing the number of wrongful convictions and death
sentences.
There were ninety-eight exonerations of death row inmates between
1970 and 2001 .20 Can we be satisfied that the appellate process identified
all wrongful convictions before executions were carried out? Can we
expect that in the future such cases will be identified before executions are
carried out? If the answer to both questions is "no," is not this the most
powerful argument in favor of overcoming the "vigilante" tradition and
abolishing the death penalty?
Based upon our knowledge of the
phenomenon of wrongful convictions to date, Zimring estimates that it is
probable that we have executed five innocent defendants since Gregg v.
Georgia.2' Perhaps more such cases could be identified
were prosecutors
22
not so loathe to allow post-execution DNA testing.
In response to the phenomenon of wrongful convictions, leaders of the
legal community, including Justice O'Connor, have called for minimum
standards for defense counsel and the resources necessary to mount an

We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open
to process such a claim.

Id. at 417. Justice Rehnquist implied that a satisfactory "state avenue" would be executive
clemency. Id.
18 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy,
stated: "I
cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is
inconsistent with the Constitution." Id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy had little trouble denying habeas relief in Collins because the
petitioner had, in their view, utterly failed to make a persuasive showing of innocence. Id. at
426 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"9Id. at 417.
20 ZIMRrNG, supra note 1, at 161.
21 428 U.S. 153 (1976); ZIMRNG, supra note 1, at 168.
22 ZIMRrNG, supra note 1,at 170.
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Zimring concludes that this reform would
adequate defense.2 3
"revolutionize capital trial and appellate practice in almost every state in the
United States that has experienced more than a few executions,"2 4 and that
"the flood of better defense counsel might finish the job" of achieving
abolition. 25 The fact that Justice O'Connor appears to have championed the
movement for state-of-the-art defense in capital cases is a hopeful sign.
Zimring notes that in an address to a group of women lawyers in
Minnesota, a state that does not have the death penalty,
Justice O'Connor
26
said, "[y]ou must breathe a sigh of relief every day.",
What are the prospects for the future and the continuing "tug of war"
between the "due process" and "vigilante" traditions? Zimring suggests
that "morally centered objections" and "morally committed activism" are
necessary in addition to whatever legal challenges lawyers for condemned
prisoners are able to advance.27 These objections should take into account
the international community's abhorrence of the death penalty, the fault
lines Zimring identifies in Supreme Court jurisprudence (particularly
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Callins v. Collins28), Justice O'Connor's
outspokenness on executing the innocent, the need for increased resources
for the defense, as well as the decision in Atkins v. Virginia.29 All of this
could crumble, however, if the composition of the Court, instead of
maintaining its present balance, becomes more conservative as vacancies
are filled.
Outside the legal arena, "a strategy of discourse and protest that is the
opposite of the gentle politics of abolition in ... Europe" is needed.30 The
focus of abolitionists should be a more aggressive campaign by human

23
24

21

Id. at 171.
id.
Id. at 172.

Further, providing good trial and appellate lawyers to all capital defendants in high-execution
states will slow down the process, virtually end procedural defaults, and put tremendous stress on
the trial resources of high-death penalty prosecutors' offices. So if the direct impact of upgrading minimum standards for counsel in capital cases does not lock the death penalty process,
then the indirect impact of a flood of better defense counsel might finish the job.

Id.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 180.
28 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
26
27

29

536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded is

unconstitutional).
30 ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 195.

THOMAS F. GERAGHTY

[Vol. 94

rights activists possessing "ethical credibility" in order to "destabilize the
mainstream support for the death penalty."'"
What are the prospects for abolition? According to Zimring,
a process of social engagement with capital punishment that is without precedent in
American history has already begun. The end game in the effort to purge the United
States of the death penalty has already been launched. The length and intensity of the

struggle necessary to end the death penalty are not yet known, but the ultimate
outcome
seems inevitable in any but the most pessimistic view of the American
32
future.

III. BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY
Beyond Repair? America's Death Penalty, contains essays by leading
legal scholars, journalists, and anti-death penalty lawyers. Samuel Gross
and Phoebe Ellsworth examine public opinion about the death penalty.33
The essays conclude that, while public support for the death penalty is still
strong, a "new script '34 is being offered in opposition to business as usual.
This conclusion is based upon the growing awareness that the death penalty
is imposed almost entirely upon the poor, that defense services are
inadequate, and that the criminal justice system makes mistakes. 35 Gross
and Ellsworth note, however, that the new script has not entirely replaced
the old one. The public's cry for retribution still resounds. 36 Politicians
who know that retribution does not sit well with many of their voters cite
deterrence as a rationale.37 Support for the death penalty declines, however,
when the reality of life imprisonment without parole is offered as an
alternative. 38 But on balance, public support for the death penalty remains
strong despite the defects in the system exposed by anti-death penalty
advocates and lawyers. Given that abolition seems unlikely, is there
another option? Gross and Ellsworth examine the "moratorium" which
allows the quality of the system to be evaluated while executions are placed

31 Id. at 199-200.
32 Id. at 205.
33 Samuel Gross & Phoebe Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans' Views on the Death
Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY, supra

note 2, at 7.
14

Id. at 27.

" Id. at 28-29.
36 Id. at 33 ("Retribution remains the major reason that people give for supporting capital
punishment.").
37 Id.

38 Id. at 35.
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on hold.39 In Illinois, a moratorium has produced a thorough examination
of the criminal justice system.4
The review of the system produced a
report which prompted the creation of a legislative package of reforms that
was recently passed by the legislature in Springfield. 41 The "moratorium
movement" that Gross and Ellsworth suggest is reminiscent of past criminal
justice reform movements, particularly those in the 1920s which focused on
defects in state criminal justice systems.42
Professor Larry Yackle, in his essay, describes the rich and important
history of federal habeas corpus.43 That history convincingly demonstrates
the need for a limited and effective system for federal review of state court
convictions. The evolution of habeas corpus jurisprudence was the result of
the need recognized by, among others, Justice Holmes, 44 to protect criminal
defendants from glaring constitutional deprivations in state courts. The
Warren era brought about the application of basic constitutional protections
to state court criminal proceedings and, consequently, increasing political
and judicial resistance to the notion that federal courts should intervene in
the state court criminal adjudications. Judicial resistance took the form of
the creation of procedural hurdles.
Congress responded with the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).4 5 All
this occurred, despite the fact that case after case demonstrated the flaws 4in6
state court adjudications. Yackle appropriately identifies the Strickland
case, which set forth the federal standard for assessing effective assistance
of counsel claims, as a major impediment to determining whether a
defendant received a fair trial.47
The prejudice prong of Strickland sets an impossibly high standard for
vindication of the right to effective assistance of counsel. This standard is
particularly inappropriate, Yackle argues, when the resources made
39 Id. at 47 ("A moratorium is an acceptable position because the current system seems to
fall short of justice. A serious investigation is necessary to discover the source of these
shortcomings and to devise remedies.").
40 Id. at 53 ("The moratorium on executions in Illinois further focused public attention on
problems in administering the death penalty and publicized the possibility of a moratorium

as a new position on the death penalty.").
41 See supra note 5.
42 See, e.g., THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (John F. Wigmore ed., 1929).
43 Larry Yackle, CapitalPunishment, Federal Courts, and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, in
BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY,
44 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).

supra note 2, at 58.

41 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2254.
46

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

47 Yackle, supra note 43, at 70 ("When counsel's behavior is bad enough to fail
the

'performance'
prejudice."').

component of the test, the Court has rarely been willing to find 'actual
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available by the states for the provision of counsel are so woefully
inadequate.48 Yackle exposes the flaws in procedural hurdles imposed by
the Supreme Court and by Congress. The "new rule" jurisprudence
governing retroactivity claims announced in Teague v. Lane49 comes under
special criticism s° as do the limits, imposed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 5' upon federal courts in
adjudicating the habeas claims of state court prisoners, litigation over filing
deadlines, procedural default, limitations on hearings in federal court, and
curbs on successive claims. These restrictions dangerously limit our justice
system's ability to provide full and fair review. 2
Journalists have played a special and effective role in exposing defects
in America's capital punishment system. No reporters have been more
skilled, dogged, and effective than Chicago Tribune reporters Steve Mills
and Ken Armstrong, whose chapter describes the near execution and
eventual exoneration of Anthony Porter, and the effect of almost executing
an innocent man had on Illinois Governor George Ryan, the architect of the
moratorium in Illinois. 3 This chapter focuses on the question of whether
we have executed innocent defendants, concluding that, "the question of

48

Id.

49 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

50 Yackle, supra note 43, at 77-78.
The Teague doctrine has been criticized in academic circles. It is implausible to propose that
federal courts create entirely "new rules" of constitutional criminal procedure whenever they
apply settled procedural rules to the circumstances of particular cases. Certainly, it is
implausible to conceive that federal courts forge "new" rules of procedure whenever they reach a
judgment regarding constitutional claim that differs from a previous state court judgment that
may have been erroneous but was still "reasonable."

Id.
"' Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see also Yackle, supra note 43, at 77-78.
52 Yackle, supra note 43, at 93.
If Americans cannot agree that capital punishment is an unworthy social policy in itself, we
should at least agree that judicial proceedings in death penalty cases must be rigorous and
scrupulously fair. Otherwise, defendants may be convicted and sentenced to die in violation of
their constitutional rights. And, in some instances, the innocent may nonetheless be executed.
Sadly, we have not committed ourselves to exacting procedural arrangements in capital cases.
Instead, the Supreme Court and Congress have compromised the one procedural mechanism that
might catch mistakes before it is too late: the federal courts' authority to examine prisoners'
constitutional claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Id.
53 Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, "Until I Can Be Sure, " How the Threat of Executing
the Innocent has Transformed the Death Penalty Debate, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 2, at 94.
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whether an innocent person has been executed remains largely
unanswerable .. .
Mills and Armstrong went to Texas and to Florida to see if such a case
could be found. Although they found cases in which the evidence against
the executed defendant was highly suspect, they were unable to develop
conclusive proof of innocence.55 Mills and Armstrong note the potential of
post-execution DNA comparisons to establish that innocent defendants
have, in fact, been executed. They wonder why some prosecutors have
opposed such inquiries.56 The chapter then identifies the factors leading to
wrongful convictions based upon examination of the 285 cases in which the
57
death penalty was imposed after it was reinstated in Illinois in 1977.
Flaws identified included incompetent legal counsel, the use of jailhouse
informants, and unreliable scientific evidence such as hair comparisons. 58
Mills and Armstrong's examination of the Texas death penalty system
revealed that in one-third of cases in which executions had taken place,
defendants were represented by an attorney who had before or after trial
been disbarred, suspended, or otherwise sanctioned.5 9 Unlike Illinois,
where appellate review of wrongful convictions has resulted in some
success, in Texas, the appellate process, according to Mills and Armstrong,
"has frequently proved tolerant of flawed convictions and reluctant to
acknowledge holes in the prosecution's case. 60
Although the "innocence" story has, in recent years, eclipsed the
"race" issue in attacks on American capital punishment, Sheri Lynn
Johnson, in her chapter Race and CapitalPunishment, notes that exonerated
death row inmates are overwhelmingly African American.6'
Johnson
describes the troubling history of disproportionate execution of blacks and
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to acknowledge the controlling fact of
racial disparities in executions absent a showing of discriminatory
purpose.
Studies conducted after McCleskey63 continue to demonstrate

14

Id. at 105.

" Id. at 117-18. ("Our work had the feel of an archeological dig. We were dusting off

artifacts that had been buried along with [the executed defendant]. In the end, we were able
to identify a host of weaknesses in the prosecution's case, but we did not unearth irrefutable
proof of innocence.")
56 Id. at 118.
7 Id. at 105.

58Id. at 105-07.
60
61

ld.
M at Ill.

Id. at 112.

Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and CapitalPunishment, in BEYOND

DEATH PENALTY,
62

supra note 2, at 123.

Id. at 166 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
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significant "race-of-victim" effects. 64

In addition, predictions of future
dangerousness, errors in identification, and jury misconduct claims often
have racial content.6 5 Prosecutors and defense lawyers often inject
conscious or unconscious negative racial stereotypes into their strategies
and comments during trial. These stereotypes work their way into the
sentencing process, especially those involving propensity to violence, 66
making it more likely that a person of color will be sentenced to death than
a white defendant. Johnson speculates that this is the result of jurors
dehumanizing non-white defendants.67 Johnson notes that restrictions on
voir dire effectively prevent defense lawyers from determining whether
white jurors can, in fact, be fair to non-white defendants. 68 Because racial
stereotypes are so ingrained in our culture and in our justice system,
Johnson laments that, "absent major revamping of the legal controls on the
behavior of all of the actors in capital cases, it is sad but safe to predict that
racial discrimination
in capital sentencing is not going to disappear any time
69
soon.
Understanding how jurors make decisions in capital cases is key to
determining whether life and death decisions are being made rationally,
intelligently, and in accordance with the law. The results of the Capital
Jury Project, a National Science Foundation-funded multi-state research
project, are described in the chapter, Lessons from the Capital Jury
Project.70 The authors, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, and Steven P.
Garvey, academics and practitioners who have extensive scholarly and
practice credentials, conclude that the system's fairness is compromised by
unqualified jurors serving in capital cases and that these jurors do not
understand the legal principles designed to control their discretion. 71 These
conclusions are based on interviews of jurors who have served in capital
cases.72 Many jurors interviewed (fourteen percent) who served in capital
cases were "unqualified" because they believed that the death penalty was
73
the only acceptable punishment in cases on which they served as jurors.

67

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Johnson, supra note 61, at 131.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 141.

68

Id. at 142.

63
64
65
66

at 143.
John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in

69 Id.
70

AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY,

71 Id.

at 145.
id.
73 Id. at 150.
72

supra note 2, at 144.
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Jurors were confused over the question of how aggravating and mitigating
factors should be weighed, over the burden of proof at sentencing,
and over
74
consideration of non-statutory mitigating factors at sentencing.
These findings raise the question of whether our legal system's
assumption that jurors will rest their decisions on the facts and the law of
particular cases is correct. If this assumption is incorrect, the dangers
inherent in our capital trial and sentencing schemes are readily apparent.
How do jurors actually decide between life and death? The authors identify
the seriousness of the crime, the remorse of the defendant, and the future
dangerousness of the defendant as key factors7.
Included in the future
dangerousness analysis conducted by jurors is the question of whether a
defendant sentenced to life will actually serve a life sentence. 76 The jurors'
race and religion are also factors in juror decision making. Interestingly,
however, the factors of race and religion, while significant in the jurors'
first vote, do not seem to play a role in the jurors' final vote. 7 Rather, the
size of the first vote majority seems to be the controlling predictor of the
final sentencing decision. 7 8 The lessons learned from talking to jurors are
clear. The selection process must be upgraded to ensure that jurors selected
are able and committed to following the law. Confusing jury instructions at
the sentencing phase means that jurors are unable to follow the law.
Finally, because many jurors state that they would not vote for death if they
knew that life without parole was a reality, jurors should be instructed that
natural life sentences do not leave open the possibility of parole.79
Another defect in the phenomenon of American punishment is the
extent to which it is inconsistent with international norms. In the chapter,
International Law and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, William A.
Schabas chronicles the status of the death penalty in international law.
" Id. at 153-59.
[L]arge numbers of jurors . . . tend to believe that mitigating factors must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and to the satisfaction of each and every juror. Unless the important
differences between the guilt-or-innocence and penalty phases of the trial and between
aggravating and mitigating factors are emphasized to them in no uncertain terms, far too many
jurors will rely instead upon the popular and erroneous beliefs they bring with them to court.

Id. at 159.
15
76

Id. at 163-66.
Id. at 165-68.

71 Id. at 173.
78 Id. at 173-74.

79 Id. at 176. The Supreme Court has ruled that this instruction must be given at the
defendant's request if the State argues that the defendant's future dangerousness is a reason
for executing him. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). See also Shafer v.
South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (holding that a jury should have been instructed that
parole was unavailable to a defendant who was given a life sentence).
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Schabas begins his discussion with the United Nation's Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which does not specifically address the issue
of capital punishment, although it provides a framework for considering the
legal effect of an evolving international consensus against capital
punishment. 80 This consensus has become so strong that "[m]ost developed
countries now refuse to extradite fugitives to the United States without
assurances that capital punishment will not be imposed., 81 In addition,
several international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, limits the death penalty to only the most serious
crimes, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits
imposition of the death penalty upon persons under eighteen years of age.82
Regional human rights systems have come close to abolition, Schabas
argues, by imposing limitations upon its use and by making available antideath penalty protocols.8 3 However, the key to a universal international
condemnation of the death penalty will be the evolving understanding of
whether the death penalty is inconsistent with the prohibition of cruel,
inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Schabas concludes that "the
argument that capital punishment is contrary to the prohibition of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading

.

. . punishment is a judicial time bomb, ticking

away inexorably as international abolition gains momentum., 84 However,
Schabas also recognizes that "the United States seems to have a studied
indifference [to international norms] possibly the consequence of its long
isolationist traditions but more likely attributable to the arrogance
associated with its status as the last remaining superpower."8, 5 Are there
strategies or interests which will make the United States responsive to
evolving international norms? Schabas suggests refusal of other countries
to extradite prisoners to the United States and the United States' "growing
status as an international pariah" could play a role.' 6

80 William A. Schabas, InternationalLaw and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, in
BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY,

"
82

supra note 2, at 178.

Id. at 182.

Id. at 183-84. The United States has not ratified the Convention. See Jaap E. Dock,

The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some Observations on the Monitoring of
the Social Context on Its Implementation, 14 FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 125 (2003) (noting that
the only other country that has not ratified the Convention isSomalia). See also UNICEF
website, at http://www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
83 Schabas, supra note 80, at 184-85.
14 Id. at 187.
8" Id.at 210.
86 Id.at 211.
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In the final chapter of the book, Franklin Zimring previews the
analysis and arguments made in his later book, The Contradictions of
American Capital Punishment, reviewed above.87 Of most relevance to
practitioners is his very clear challenge to the judicial system: "Trying to
administer the death penalty on a recurrent basis creates an unprecedented
tension between the willingness of a legal system to investigate allegations
of illegality and the prompt administration of the prescribed punishment for
crimes. ' 88 Zimring also notes that the "resentment of judicial review is
exacerbated by the genuine dilemmas of federalism in the enforcement of
constitutional standards in state death cases."89 Streamlining the death
penalty, the consequence of judicial and congressional hostility to
prolonged appeals, will increase the likelihood that innocent defendants will
be executed. The conflict between speed, efficiency, and reliability conflict
in the context of the phenomenon of wrongful convictions. Zimring
predicts that the public will rightly condemn a system that condones, by
virtue of the architecture of the system, execution of the innocent:
These inherent conflicts are a fault line under the superficial stability of citizen
support for the death penalty in the United States. The execution system can never
live up to the public's standards for a death penalty worthy of support. It will be
either too cumbersome and halfhearted when appeals are allowed or arbitrary and
unjust when they are restricted. The death penalty in the United States is destabilized
by the inherent limits of
mass criminal justice. The only clear path out of the impasse
90
is an end to executions.
It is interesting to note that Zimring's final observation in Beyond
Repair? America's Death Penalty is much more optimistic than the overall
tone of his book, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment in
which he identifies the wrongful conviction phenomenon as a standard
bearer for abolition but also notes that a significant effort to influence
public opinion will also be necessary.
IV. KANSAS CHARLEY: THE STORY OF A 19TH CENTURY BOY MURDERER
The first two books reviewed in this essay, The Contradictions of
American Capital Punishment9 ' and Beyond Repair? America's Death

87

Franklin Zimring, Postscript: The PeculiarPresent of American CapitalPunishment,

in BEYOND REPAIR?
supra note I.

AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY,

88 Zimring, supra note 87, at 225.
89 Id.

90 Id. at 228-29.
91 ZIMRING, supra note 1.

supra note 2, at 212. See also ZIMRING,
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Penalty,92 contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon of capital
punishment in the United States through their examination of trends,
statistics, legal doctrine, and public policy. There is another equally
powerful way to understand America's death penalty. That is through an
examination of individual cases which tell the stories of the characters
involved-the defendant, the victims and the victims' families, the defense
lawyer, the prosecutor, and the judge. Another "character" or influence in
these cases is, of course, the court of public opinion.
Joan Jacobs Brumberg has managed to put all of these perspectives
together in her book, Kansas Charley: The Story of a 19th Century Boy
Murderer.9 3 Professor Brumberg, a social historian at Cornell University,
tells the story of a boy who committed a double murder at age sixteen and
was executed in 1892 at the age of eighteen in Cheyenne, Wyoming.94 The
story is the product of Professor Brumberg's remarkable investigation of a
variety of documentary sources including social service archives,
newspaper accounts, a transcript of the defendant's trial, and personal
papers of some of the characters involved. The details and the theme of the
story should resonate with all who have been engaged in the debate over
capital punishment or in the prosecution or defense of capital cases: an
egregious and sensational crime committed by a child who was no angel, an
economically and socially deprived defendant, a defendant with
undiagnosed and misunderstood psychological problems, a history of
parental neglect, and physical abuse by adults charged with the
responsibility for the care of the defendant. Add to the mix outraged family
members of the victims, defense counsel overmatched by the prosecution, a
trial judge and a governor susceptible to political pressures (from death
penalty advocates and death penalty opponents) when deciding whether to
impose and to carry out the sentence. Finally, the genesis and continuing
tradition in the United States of executing juveniles is described in the
context of a real case.
The story begins in New York City in November 1874, where Charley
was born to immigrant German parents. Charley's mother died when he
was four, leaving his father to care for him and his brother and sister. A
year later, Charley's father, who had turned to alcohol when unemployment
and the loss of his wife made him despondent, committed suicide by
drinking insecticide. Charley and his three siblings were admitted to the
92 BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA's DEATH PENALTY,

supra note 2.

93 BRUMBERG, supra note 3.
94 A leading physician of the time opined that "masturbation was common among the
insane, a finding that many took to mean that it was causative in what came to be known as
'masturbatory induced insanity."' Id.
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New York Orphan Asylum where they were well fed, clothed, and
subjected to rigorous discipline, including regular beatings for disciplinary
violations. Charley's brothers and his sisters did relatively well there and
were placed with families. One of Charley's brothers was sent westward on
an "orphan train." Charley, however, suffered from chronic bed-wetting.
In order to address this problem and to head off masturbation, a constant
Victorian concern, a physician at the New York Orphan Society decided
that Charley should be circumcised at age twelve. Not only did he not look
like boys his age, his chronic bed wetting continued, causing him
continuing embarrassment.
Charley Miller's first placement out of the asylum was unsuccessful
because of this problem as was his second placement in Minnesota where
his foster father finally abandoned him at a train station with no money or
ticket back to New York. Charley was forced to go it alone until he was
reunited with his brother in Kansas with the help of the New York Orphan
Society. At age fourteen, he ran away from his Kansas placement,
complaining that his host family did not clothe him. He hoped to join his
older sister in Rochester, New York. Along the way, he became enamored
with life on the road, adopting the nickname "Kansas Charley" in order to
impress his fellow vagabonds and in imitation of the dime novels he liked
to read. When he was reunited with his sister in Rochester, New York,
where she had come to live with a prosperous family, he roamed the streets
in search of adventure and fancy clothes. After spending eight months with
his sister, he headed west to become a cowboy. This trip involved detours
to New York and to Philadelphia. It was during this time that Charley
apparently began to routinely commit petty crimes, winding up in a
correctional facility in Philadelphia. After his release, he appeared to be
proud that he had "served time." Heading westward on freight trains, he
was gang raped by older vagabonds. To protect himself, he bought a .38
caliber pistol.
Charley met the two young men he shot to death in a Nebraska train
yard and he traveled westward with them. The victims, from Missouri,
were heading west with the support and permission of their parents to begin
new lives in Wyoming. During the trip, Charley shot and killed the two
young men. He took money and personal items from the victims and then
left the train at the next stop looking for food. The bodies were discovered
by railroad workers.
Two weeks after the shooting, Charley traveled to Kansas, where he
told his brother that he had committed the crime which was now receiving
national attention in the newspapers. In Kansas, Charley turned himself in
and made a statement admitting guilt to a local sheriff and a newspaper
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editor. The confession, which contained the story of Charley's life, was
printed in newspapers around the country. As he returned to Wyoming in
custody, the debate was raging about how to deal with what Charley had
done. Should he stand trial and face the death penalty? Or should he be
treated as a child who had been deprived of love, family, food, and
guidance by caring adults? The victims' parents weighed in on this debate,
characterizing Charley as a 95"depraved, deliberate killer rather than a
deprived, remorseful orphan.
Court proceedings in Cheyenne began shortly after Charley was
returned there from Kansas. A lawyer was appointed to represent him. The
lawyer was paid $100 for his services. He had never tried a capital case.
His experience at the bar was limited. Prior to representing Charley, he
focused more on business opportunities than on legal practice.96 Pitted
against Charley's lawyer was an experienced and aggressive prosecutor
with important political and social connections to Wyoming's ruling elite.
The prosecutor put on his case with skill and attention to detail. Charley's
lawyer appeared to have no theory of defense. Despite the fact that the
bodies were surrounded by empty bottles, there was no effort on the part of
the defense to portray the crime as alcohol-related and no effort to call into
question the character of the victims in order to suggest a motive for the
killing.9 7 Rather, the defense lawyer attempted to undermine the credibility
of Charley's confession by pointing out that Charley was left alone for a
long period of time with the sheriff and newspaper editor who took the
statement. The defense contended that the account of what Charley said
was intended to be good newspaper copy instead of a reliable account of the
conversation. Since Charley's motive for the killing was key to the jury's
decision on both guilt-innocence and sentencing, the direct and crossexamination of the sheriff and the newspaper editor were crucial. No
accurate transcription of the original confession was made. The witnesses
relied upon their memories and their notes of the conversation. The

" Id. at 100.
96 Later, Charley's lawyer would make valiant, if somewhat misguided, attempts to save
Charley's life.
97 Brumberg observes:
A more skilled attorney might have tried to suggest that [the victims] were roughnecks, or that
Ross, the more adventurous of the two, led Waldo into risky activities that he would never have
undertaken on his own. But [the defense lawyer] did neither. Whatever his reasons, the decision
to ignore the influence of alcohol empowered the prosecution. By failing to suggest that the
victims were impudent young law breakers stoked by the liquor they had been drinking all day,
[the defense lawyer] allowed the prosecution to hold the moral high ground.

Id. at

117.
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prosecution's witnesses testified that Charley told them he killed for money.
The defense was not able to shake them.
Charley was called to the stand. He was asked about his background, a
compelling story of deprivation. But he told the story with little emotion,
and his lawyer did not draw out the details of what must have been
horrendous experiences for a child. Likewise, his account of'the crime
provided the jury with little information upon which to base an
understanding of the crime. Charley's relationship with the two victims
was not explored except for the fact that he was angry at the victims
because they ignored him after he had given them food. Charley was either
unwilling or unable to articulate a sympathetic motive for the killings,
perhaps in part because his lawyer did not dig deeply enough into the
circumstances prior to the time of the killing.9 8 The prosecution took ample
advantage of Charley's failure to provide a reason for his actions. The next
day's newspapers "made it clear that he had won few hearts." 99 Brumberg
attributes this to his defense lawyer, who
flubbed an important opportunity to show that his unrefined client had some sense of
morality and duty . . .[the defense lawyer] never developed the idea that when
[Charley] turned himself in to the authorities it was a brave act of moral conscience,
100 a
marker of responsibility, and not a desire for notoriety, as some people proposed.
Having failed to provide a rational explanation for his client's
behavior, the defense lawyer raised the issue of insanity.' 1 Recalling
Charley to the stand after a night's recess, Charley was asked about his
habit of masturbating. It was established that he masturbated three to four
times per day. This information was brought out in order to establish that
Charley had been rendered insane by this "unclean" practice. Five expert
witnesses were called in an effort to establish a connection between
masturbation and the murders. None were convincing. Finally, Charley
was asked about the gang rape in the boxcar. Charley testified that he had
been assaulted, but was not able to convey the horror of the incident.
98

Brumberg writes:

Was [Charley) afraid that the boys from St. Joe would call him a filthy street waif or say
something else that was mean? Or was there something in their attitude or behavior that
frightened him by bringing up memories of the time he had been attacked in the boxcar by older
men? Today, the idea that Miller may have experienced "homosexual panic" as the result of his
prior sexual abuse would have been part of the arsenal of a savvy defense lawyer.

Id. at 132.
99 Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
101 The author suggests that this tactic was not planned. However, the defense was able
100

to produce five "expert" witnesses in relatively short order, suggesting that such a defense
may have been contemplated from the beginning.
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Charley displayed little emotion when the jury's verdict finding him
guilty of first degree murder was read in court. His apparent impassivity
was another nail in his coffin.
The post-verdict proceedings in the case included an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Wyoming and a petition for clemency directed to the
Governor. His death sentence was stayed as Charley's lawyer prepared the
appeal.
As the appeals and clemency proceedings progressed, the
Governor, as well as women's groups such as the Women's Christian
Temperance Union, became central figures in the debate over whether the
juvenile condemned to death would live or die. The Episcopal Bishop of
Wyoming also entered the debate, urging the Governor to commute
Charley's sentence as did the president of the Union Pacific Railroad. The
prominent Rochester businessman who provided a home for Charley's
sister weighed in with a petition signed by other prominent New York
citizens opposing execution. This petition cited provisions of New York
law which prohibited execution of juveniles.
In the midst of this outpouring of sentiment against imposition of the
death penalty, Charley escaped from prison not once, but twice. He became
older. He appeared, because of his actions and age, to be more
sophisticated than the unfortunate waif who was portrayed at trial. His
conviction was affirmed and an execution date was set. The case went to
the Governor. He visited Charley in jail as part of his decision-making
process. Eventually, the Governor's decision seemed to rest on the question
of whether Charley's trial had been fair and whether there was any doubt of
his guilt. The Governor was also concerned about the prospect of increased
vigilantism, a phenomenon that was to be feared in the frontier West of the
late nineteenth century, should he grant the petition for commutation. He
denied the petition.
Charley sent out invitations to his execution. He talked to reporters in
greater detail about the travails of his life. As to a motive for the killings,
Charley denied that he killed for money, claiming that he was drunk at the
time he killed his companions. However, he appeared to display little
understanding of or contrition for the murders. When asked by friends why
he committed the murders he said, "I don't know. When I saw what I had
done it all seemed like a dream to me. I have tried to give reasons to myself
and to [you] and to other friends, but I can't tell."' 2 Charley was hanged in
the courtyard of the Cheyenne courthouse on April 22, 1892.

'02 Id. at 228.
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According to Brumberg, Charley's life and execution confirm that the
United States has an "ugly history of executing poor children."'10 3 These
pressures are still with us. Harsh treatment of juveniles (particular transfer
of juveniles from juvenile to criminal court) characterized the period of
1980-1995. The Supreme Court has been presented with cases involving
the execution of children 0 4 and the mentally retarded. 105 Unless things
change, we will continue to execute juveniles. Have we made any progress
since 1892?
Professor Brumberg's book suggests that we have not. We are still
executing juveniles.
We still do not provide adequate counsel and
resources for the defense of capital cases. Political influences still infect the
death process. There is a divide in the United States between those states
which routinely execute and those which do not. What should death
penalty advocates take away from this book?
Professor Brumberg's detailed reconstruction of a single case
epitomized the efforts of death penalty lawyers to tell the stories of their
clients' lives and the stories about how the criminal justice system has
fallen short. It is through the history of Charley's life that we understand
the political, social, and economic inequities that produced Charley, and
which explain his prosecution and execution.

'' Id. at 240.
104 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)

(holding that the Eighth

Amendment prohibits execution of a fifteen year old); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit execution of a seventeen year
old); see also Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Stevens noted:
Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for a crime he committed
when he was 17 years old. In his dissenting opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382,

109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), Justice BRENNAN, writing for four Members of the
Court, explained why the Eighth Amendment prohibits the taking of the life of a person as
punishment for a crime committed when below the age of 18. 1 joined that opinion and remain

convinced that it correctly interpreted the law. Since that opinion was written, the issue has been
the subject of further debate and discussion both in this country and in other civilized nations.
Given the apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the international community
against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on a juvenile offender, I think it would be
appropriate for the Court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity. I would therefore grant a
stay of this execution to give the Court an opportunity to confront the question at its next
scheduled conference in September.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of a

stay.

Id.

105 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment

prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded).
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V. THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY

I have represented relatively few clients in death penalty cases. But in
just the cases randomly assigned to me on appeal by the Supreme Court of
Illinois, I was confronted with the following: a case in which, prior to my
client's plea of guilty and sentence of death, unknown to all in the
courtroom, my client was taking psychotropic medication; 0 6 a case in
which we eventually obtained relief in a state court post-conviction petition
because the trial court judge attempted to extort a bribe from my client's
family in order to avoid a death sentence; 10 7 a case in which, despite the fact
that my client claimed that he was tortured by police, his former attorney
10 8
did not file a motion to suppress and presented no evidence in mitigation;
a case in which our Supreme Court held that my client should be permitted
to present modus operandi evidence regarding police torture of suspects and
that he was not adequately represented at sentencing.' °9 Our Legal Clinic is
currently in the process of amending a post-conviction petition in which it
appears that evidence of the prosecution's relationship with an
informant/jail house snitch was withheld from the defense. This case has
also been remanded to the trial court to allow presentation of evidence
regarding systemic police torture of suspects." 10
While these cases and others like them were percolating through
Illinois' justice system, Illinois discovered that it had wrongfully convicted
thirteen defendants sentenced to death."' The near execution of Anthony
Porter," 12 later proved to be innocent, prompted Governor Ryan to impose a

106 See
107 See

People v. Kinkead, 695 N.E.2d 1255 (III. 1996).
People v. Titone, 747 N.E.2d 357 (III. 2001); see also United States v. Maloney,

71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995).
log See People v. Orange, 749 N.E.2d 932 (I11.
2001); Exec. Order Pardoning Leroy
Orange, Jan. 10, 2003. Illinois law has recently allowed the introduction of such modus
operandi evidence. See United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Gilmore, 1999 WL 688782 (N.D.
I11.
1999); People v. Patterson, 735 N.E.2d 616 (I11.
2000); People v. Cannon, 602 N.E.2d
461 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
109See People v. King, 735 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. 2000).
"1o See People v. Kitchen, 727 N.E.2d 189 (Il. 1999).
111Bennie M. Currie, Death Penalty Opponents,Exonerated Inmates Gatherin Chicago,

Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 15, 2002; Steve Mills & Christi Parsons, Ryan's Panel Urges Fixes in
Death Penalty; 2-year Study'Says Fatal Flaw Exists, Ciu. TRIB., Apr. 15, 2002, at Al;
Michael Sneed & Dave Newbart, Ryan Studies Death Row Cases: 'There Probablyare Some
People We Can Commute', CH. TRIB., Mar. 3, 2002, at A3.
112See People v. Porter, 647 N.E.2d 972 (II1.1995); Monica Davey, Cleared in Murders,
but He's Not Home Free Yet, Cmu. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1999, at Al; Debbie Howlett,
Moratorium Effort Intensifies in Illinois, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2000, at 13A; Dirk Johnson,
Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al.
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moratorium on carrying out death sentences in Illinois in January 2000.'13
After announcing the moratorium, Governor Ryan, in March of 2000,
convened a commission, composed of prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges,
and non-lawyer members of the community, to "determine what reforms, if
any, would ensure that the Illinois capital punishment system is fair, just,
and accurate."' 1 4 The Ryan Commission issued its report in April 2002
after reviewing Illinois cases in which the death penalty had been imposed.
The work of the Ryan Commission focused on an intensive examination of
the thirteen wrongful convictions, a review of all 250 cases in which the
death penalty had been imposed in Illinois since 1977, research on the
impact of the death penalty on victims, a review of death penalty laws in
other jurisdictions, the views of experts on the death penalty, and the efforts
of other jurisdictions to address problems in their death penalty systems.' Is
Common themes in the cases of the thirteen wrongfully convicted were thin
evidence,' 6 the use of in-custody informants," 7 and faulty eye-witness
identifications."18 The Ryan Commission noted that more than half of the
250 cases in which the death penalty had been imposed in Illinois were
reversed for trial related and sentencing errors."19
The Commission examined all aspects of the death penalty process,
beginning with police and pre-trial investigations, finding unanimously that
the phenomenon of "tunnel vision," or "confirmatory bias" often interfered
with thorough and unbiased inquiries. 2 ° Police and prosecutors should also
be required to list exculpatory evidence uncovered during an investigation
The Commission also recommended that
and to maintain those records.'
legislation authorize the appointment of a public defender for indigent
defendants who are subject to police investigation. 22 Interrogations should
113 William Claibome, Ill. Governor, CitingErrors, Will Block Executions, WASH. POST,
Jan. 31, 2000, at A01; Maureen O'Donnell, Illinois to Stop Executions; Ryan Panel to Study
13 Wrongful Convictions, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000,at 3.
"1 RYAN COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
"I Id. at 2-3.
116

The report concludes:

solid
evidence connecting the defendants to
All 13 cases were characterized by relatively little
the crimes. In some cases, the evidence was so minimal that there was some question not only as
to why the prosecutor sought the death penalty, but why the prosecution was even pursued
against the individual defendant.

Id. at 7.
117 Id.
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Id. at 8.
Id.at9.
Id.at 20.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
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be video-taped. This recommendation specifically noted that, "video-taping
should not include merely the statement made by the suspect after
interrogation, but the entire interrogation process. ' 1 3
Other
recommendations of the Commission included careful recording of witness
statements 124 and management of lineups to avoid suggestiveness.1 2 5 The

detailed examination of identification procedures undertaken by the
Commission underscored its concern about the past and future of the
reliability of identifications absent a wholesale overhaul of the ways in
which lineups are currently conducted. The Commission also focused on
the need to improve the state's forensic evidence analysis and collection
systems, recommending that the state's ability to collect and analyze DNA
evidence be augmented and that an independent, state-funded forensic
laboratory be created. 6
Central to the Commission's recommendations was that the number of
death penalty cases prosecuted be reduced by reducing the number of deatheligible crimes 2 7 and through prosecutors' consideration of state-wide
standards for selection of death cases. 128 Other recommendations included
steps to be taken to educate trial court judges, 129 the training and
certification of lawyers who try death penalty cases, 30 expanded and better
supervised discovery procedures,13 ' procedures for trial judges to follow in
ensuring that juries understand the weaknesses inherent in eye-witness
32
identifications,

informant testimony,

33

and the weight to be given to

123 Id. at 24. This recommendation was partially implemented by the Cook County
State's Attorney who announced in October 1998 that he would video-tape all "confessions"
in homicide cases. He rejected the suggestion that the entire interrogation should be video-

taped, stating "[n]o matter when we start videotaping, there will be individuals who say
something happened before the videotaping." Flynn McRoberts & Judy Peres, Homicide
Suspects May Go to Videotape; Confessions on Camera Planned in Aftermath of Ryan
HarrisCase, CH-. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1998, at Al. Subsequently, the Illinois legislature, as part of
a death penalty reform package, sent legislation to the Governor requiring that defendants'
statements sought to be introduced in death penalty cases "must be electronically recorded
and the recording must be substantially accurate and not intentionally altered." S.B. 15, 93d
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I1. 2003). This bill has been signed into law. See 2003 Ill. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 93-517 (West). For further discussion see supra note 5.
124 RYAN COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 4, at 29-30.

12 Id. at 32-40.
126

id. at 52.

127 Id.at 65-75.
121 Id. at 81-82.
129 Id. at 94.
130 Id.

at 105-11.

131 Id. at 117.
132

id. at 129.

133 Id. at 131.
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confessions. 3 4 The sentencing phase of death penalty proceedings should
be enhanced by expanded discovery rules explicitly covering the sentencing
process, 5 explicit recognition of a history of extreme emotional or physical
abuse as a mitigating factor, 136 and by requiring the jury to be advised of
alternative sentences that may be imposed. 137 The Commission rejected the
The
proposal that a "residual doubt" instruction be required. 38
Commission also recommended that the jury instructions governing the
mitigation evidence be simplified to make
weighing of aggravating and
139
them more understandable.
The Commission's concern about the reliability of eyewitness,
testimony was highlighted by its
informant, and accomplice
recommendation that sentencing juries be instructed that such evidence
cannot be the sole basis for a decision to impose the death penalty. 140 This
recommendation arguably fills the void created by the Commission's
recommendation that no residual doubt instruction be required. Another
concession to the concerns implicit in proposals to give a residual doubt
instruction was the recommendation that the trial court judge state whether
he or she concurs in the decision of a jury which imposes a death sentence.
If the judge41 does not concur, the defendant shall be sentenced to natural life
in prison.
The Commission recommended expansion rather than contraction of
appellate and post-conviction remedies with the objective of allowing
defendants to raise meritorious claims and defenses while at the same time
speeding up the post-conviction process. 42 There should be a liberal right
creating a
to amend petitions based on newly discovered evidence
43
innocent.
is
defendant
the
believing
for
basis
substantial
Noting that the bill embodying significant reforms had passed the
Illinois General Assembly and the Illinois Senate by overwhelming
margins, the Chicago Tribune congratulated state legislators for banning the
execution of the mentally retarded, for broadening the availability of DNA
testing, for focusing on the need to ensure the reliability of confessions
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Id. at 133.

...Id. at 138.
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Id. at 141.

131 Id. at
138 Id. at

144.

147-48.
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through video-taping, and for setting up a study commission to determine
whether death penalty sentences were being sought with racial and
geographical balance.1 44 However, the Tribune vigorously criticized the
legislature for not enacting a thorough "fix" of the system: "[1]ike being a
little bit pregnant, the state can't afford to be a little bit wrong when it
comes to executing a human being., 145 The Tribune editorial listed what
was missing from the legislative package: a provision that would have
limited Illinois's twenty-one eligibility factors; an independently managed
state crime lab; a process for reviewing state prosecutors' decisions to seek
the death penalty (the editorial noted that, "statistics show that a defendant
is ten times more likely to face a death sentence in DuPage County than he
is in Cook County," and that a "defendant in Illinois is four times more
likely to receive a death sentence for killing a white person than for killing a
minority person") 146 and a system for examining the factors that produce
wrongful convictions. 47 Finally, the Chicago Tribune noted:
It is not time to rest, though. As tempting as it might be to see how these new fixes

work before considering additional reforms, we still don't have the luxury of time.
And if there are some in the legislature who still worry that support for these measures
makes them too soft on crime, they should remember this: Sending the1 48
wrong person

to prison-or to death-doesn't fight crime. It allows killers to roam free.
VI. CONCLUSION

The works reviewed in this essay prompts us to reflect on a range of
issues associated with the death penalty. The work reminds us of how
many different fora and settings there are in which the morality, the
justness, and the desirability and utility of the death penalty are debated.
Professor Zimring provides us with a public policy perspective based upon
analyses of history, statistics, and developments in death penalty
jurisprudence. Professor Garvey has collected a series of essays that
describe the phenomenon of the death penalty in the context of public
opinion and the concrete challenges faced by defendants and lawyers in
court. Professor Brumberg tells the story of one case that demonstrates
persuasively that history continues to repeat itself The Ryan Commission
Report, and the legislation that it spawned, represent an effort to prevent
history from repeating itself by taking a close look at the mechanics of
144Ray Long & John Chase, Deal Okd on Death Penalty Reforms, CHI. TRJB., Nov. 6,

2003, at Al.
145A Powerful Vote for Justice, CHI.TRIB., June 1,2003, at C8.
146id.
147id.
148id.
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death to see whether the machinery can consistently produce justice. Each
of these perspectives and approaches contained in the material reviewed
here are essential to deepening our understanding of why America
continues to hold on to the death penalty. Each of these perspectives tell us
much about what steps we must take in order to best protect defendants
subject to death in a system that will continue to execute for the foreseeable
future.
What the books do not do, and what they are not designed to do, is to
address the deeply held and sometimes strident beliefs of death penalty
proponents. One reviewer of Professor Zimring's book wrote:
[Zimring] mocks victim recognition as a new opiate of the people, an illusion foisted
on the suffering by a cynical and brutal system. According to Mr. Zimring, the
"relief' that the family and friends of a murder victim experience when the murderer
is executed simply means "that the additional pain and uncertainty inflicted by the
death penalty process"-not the murderer-"has come to an end." It seems not to have
dawned on him that this "relief' might have a rational, moral component, that what
the victims actually find is a reaffirmation of the fundamental value of innocent life
and their loved one's life in particular. Mr. Zimring doesn't grasp the core appeal of
capital punishment to many thoughtful, decent people. "The issue," as Scott Turow
149
recently wrote, "is not revenge or retribution, exactly, so much as moral order."'

Later, the author of this review notes that there is enough "grist for the mill"
to lay a solid foundation for opposition to the death penalty as administered
in Texas and Florida without resorting to the racially charged vigilante
label.5 0
Herein lies the problem. Both sides must recognize the integrity of
responsible proponents of anti-death penalty and pro-death penalty stands,
but there is no process in place, other than an adversarial one, in which
exchange of information and ideas can occur. If the short-term prospects
for abolition are bleak, we need to start talking to an inclusive community
of lawyers, judges, scholars, and citizens in order to achieve consensus that
we cannot tolerate the defective system that now exists.

149 Kevin J. O'Brien, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, N.Y.
L.J.,
May 2, 2003 (book review).
15oId.
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